pointing committee chairs or co-chairs with no conflicts of interest, and limiting committee members with conflicts of interest to a minority. Notably, 14 of the 18 panels had chairs with industry payments and 10 had a majority of members with payments. 1 In the other report, Combs and colleagues 3 found that among 15 clinical practice guidelines in gastroenterology, 44 (53.0%) of 83 authors received industry payments; some were substantial and not all were disclosed. If the specialty societies and other organizations that prepare clinical practice guidelines are unwilling or unable to improve their performance in disclosing, managing, and eliminating financial conflicts of interest, what can be done? The federal government has shown no interest in investing in clinical practice guidelines prepared by an entity independent of the drug and medical device industries, as the United Kingdom does with the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence. Preparation of guidelines by an independent public body with assured funding and independence could be an effective approach, not only for eliminating issues related to financial conflicts of interest but also for assuring the use of rigorous methodologies and avoiding the wasteful duplication of efforts by multiple committees. Public and private health insurers could also disregard clinical practice guidelines that do not adhere at a minimum to the National Academy of Medicine standards. 2 The standards are a floor, not a ceiling; no committee members need to have financial conflicts of interest, for example.
Financial conflicts of interest in clinical practice guidelines remain an intractable problem in the United States, and improvement is unlikely without decisive actions. Unfortunately, many of the professional societies that convene panels to develop practice guidelines have financial conflicts of interest with industry themselves, and members may have conflicts related to recommendations about when to perform diagnostic tests, procedures, or surgeries from which they derive income. Robust, objective, and unbiased clinical practice guidelines support improvements in patient care; the best interests of patients are the paramount consideration. more institutional postacute care use (41.5% vs 30.7%; P < .001), and higher readmission rates (10.9% vs 8.0%; P < .005), suggesting higher CJR episode spending. Hospitals that left the program also had lower submission rates of patient-reported outcomes (19.9% vs 41.9%; P < .001) and were less likely than hospitals that remained in the program to have received reconciliation payments (46.3% vs 72.0%; P < .001). All of these associations persisted after adjusting for MSA-level factors.
Discussion | Hospitals that left the CJR program when it became voluntary served a higher percentage of nonwhite and Medicaid-enrolled patients and performed poorly in the program. These hospitals may have left the program because they would be more likely to sustain financial losses by remaining in the program. However, patients at these hospitals may gain the most from improvements in care coordination. Hospitals with a higher proportion of socially vulnerable patients might be more likely to leave the program because episode spending for these patients tends to be high owing to greater complication rates and more common use of institutional postacute care.
3-5 The CJR program cost thresholds are more restrictive for hospitals with historical costs higher than regional average rates because the threshold is a weighted average of each hospital's historical and regional costs in the first 3 years of the program and will be entirely based on regional costs starting in 2019. This study has limitations. Program performance in 2017 was not examined. Medicare began covering outpatient knee replacements in 2018, which may have affected hospitals' decisions to leave the program. Our analysis is descriptive and did not examine the relative influence of hospital characteristics on the decision to leave the program. Nevertheless, we found that hospitals exiting the CJR program were those whose patients might benefit the most from improved care coordination. Our findings suggest that the wider use of voluntary value-based payment programs by Medicare is problematic and that effective strategies that result in greater hospital participation in these programs are needed. While undoubtedly high, the 73% dropout rate observed in this study is not entirely unexpected. The CJR program was originally mandatory and excluded BPCI participants. Thus, it is likely that most, if not all, CJR participants would not have signed up for the CJR program if it had been voluntary from the outset. That 46.3% of exiting hospitals chose to leave the program despite achieving savings suggests that many hospitals that experienced early success in this program may have been skeptical that they could sustain these gains in years 3 to 5 of the CJR program, when they would be exposed to greater downside financial risk and quality outcomes would be benchmarked to regional peers.
This study contributes meaningfully to our understanding of the drivers of performance associated with joint-replacement bundled payments, the types of hospitals that are more and less likely to perform well under this payment model (both for joint replacements and overall), and the prerequisite conditions necessary to succeed under bundled payment programs. The major drivers of performance for joint-replacement bundled payments include the delivery of more efficient inpatient care (often aided by standardized care pathways), more judicious use of inpatient PAC (and greater use of postdischarge home health services), and the ability to negotiate lower prices on joint prostheses. Recent work has shown that it is possible to achieve savings with bundled payments for LEJR without compromising quality of care.
3 Two contemporary studies found that participation in voluntary LEJR bundled payments offered through the BPCI, and its predecessor, the Acute Care Episodes initiative, was associated with lower total spending and equivalent quality of care during the bundle time period. 4,5 Lower utilization of inpatient PAC accounted for most of the savings across hospitals participating in BPCI bundled payments for LEJR. However, Navathe et al 6 showed that, between 2009 and 2015, a health system that participated in both the Acute Care Episodes and BPCI initiatives reduced lowerextremity joint prosthesis costs by 29% (about $1192 per prosthesis), inpatient supply costs by 66% (about $728 per hospitalization), and room and board costs by 33% (about $471 per hospitalization). 4 Navathe et al 6 also found that hospitals that earned savings during the CJR program's first year were larger, less likely to be safety-net hospitals (22% vs 37%), and more likely to be integrated with a PAC facility compared with hospitals that did not earn savings. Hospitals that earned savings also reported a volume of twice as many joint replacements, on average compared with hospitals that did not earn savings. With this context in mind, the study by Kim et al 2 both affirms that some hospitals can successfully save money with LEJR bundled payments and engenders skepticism that bundled payments, as deployed in the CJR program, represent a viable policy tool for improving care quality across a diverse cohort of US hospitals. This study reinforces that hospitals that are smaller, less well integrated with PAC facility, have a lower volume of joint surgeries, and care for more underserved and minority patients are both less likely to save money with bundled payments and more likely to eschew them. An analysis of hospitals that enrolled in the BPCI yielded similar findings 7 ; this increasingly wellestablished pattern is both predictable and highly problematic. Hospitals with these characteristics might be expected to struggle under, and therefore avoid, bundled payments because these hospitals lack control over many, if not all, of the levers necessary to consistently generate savings using this payment scheme. For example, smaller hospitals have lower PAC volumes and are thus less likely to integrate with a PAC facility. Many dual-eligible patients (ie, those eligible for both Medicare and Medicaid insurance) may be discharged to PAC facilities because they lack the necessary support at home to ensure a safe discharge into the community; hospitals that treat greater numbers of these patients may therefore have limited ability to modulate PAC utilization after LEJR. Furthermore, hospitals with low joint replacement volumes may have limited power to negotiate lower prices for joint prostheses. In addition, safety-net hospitals and many small hospitals may lack the funding and resources to redesign care pathways for LEJR to reduce avoidable inpatient and PAC spending. For these hospitals, using limited quality improvement resources to improve care for more common, costly, and morbid conditions may lead to greater overall quality gains and savings.
One additional limitation of bundled payments associated with treatments, as the CJR program payment bundles are, is that they do not include a measure of treatment appropriateness. Holding clinicians and hospitals financially accountable for both safety and efficacy outcomes, which the CJR begins to do by tying quality performance to financial outcomes, is one way to incentivize appropriate allocation of treatment. To date, studies have not found evidence of systematic overutilization or underutilization under the CJR program or other bundled payment programs, but close, ongoing oversight of utilization patterns under this payment model seems prudent.
Any responsible and reasonable effort to promote greater adoption of voluntary bundled payment pilots or to broadly implement mandatory bundles should be accompanied by initiatives that give smaller, lower-volume, less well-resourced, and safetynet hospitals a reasonable chance to meet spending and quality benchmarks under bundled payments. Policymakers could reduce barriers to entry and achievement of long-term performance targets for these hospitals in several ways. For example, while episode payments under the CJR and BPCI programs are risk adjusted for patients' baseline clinical comorbidities, they are not adjusted for social risk factors, including socioeconomic status, which have been shown to influence total costs of care independent of clinical risk factors. Adjusting bundled payments for social risk fac-tors could help level the playing field for hospitals serving disadvantaged patients. Moreover, policymakers could provide underresourced hospitals with access to quality-improvement assistance or introduce downside risk more slowly for these hospitals. Additionally, creating separate tracks for low-and highvolume hospitals, and hospitals with vastly different clinical capabilities and resources, might persuade lower-volume, less well-resourced, and safety-net hospitals to join future bundled payment programs.
7 Ultimately, if bundled payments are to truly achieve their promise as a broadly viable tool for improving the efficiency of care, then policymakers and health systems leaders must make it easier for a diverse set of acute care hospitals to participate in and excel under bundled payment programs. 
LESS IS MORE

Analysis of Diagnostic Test Ordering Habits Among Internal Medicine Residents
The Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care sheds light on wide variations in spending for Medicare beneficiaries in the 6 months before their death. 1 That report has led to several efforts to better standardize patient care. High-value care has been defined as the seventh competency, with national efforts to educate physicians and physicians in training about how to deliver higher-quality care, while decreasing the cost of that care.
2 Medical students and residents are particular targets for this effort because of the known "imprinting," or sustained influence, that the training environment has on practice habits during a physician's career.
3
Kahneman and colleagues 4 found that professionals express a much greater-than-expected degree of variability in the outcomes of their work, even when given the same data with which to base their conclusions. We are aware of 2 previous studies that showed a large degree of variability in resident patterns of test ordering. One study 5 analyzed outpatient test ordering in 1987, and another, 6 "practice intensity" in 2015.
Methods | We analyzed electronic diagnostic test orders placed in the inpatient medical record by internal medicine residents at an academic medical center (NewYork-Presbyterian/ Weill Cornell Medical Center). Among 139 internal medicine residents in this study, we compared the aggregate profiles of each resident over the course of academic year (AY) 2016-2017 for the total number of tests each resident ordered and the mean number of tests each resident ordered per patient for whom he or she provided care. The Weill Cornell Medicine institutional review board approved this study and granted an exemption from human participant review because all data were deidentified.
Results | The residents in the New York-Presbyterian (Cornell Campus) internal medicine residency program ordered laboratory tests for 10 707 patients during 13 469 unique patient hospitalizations in AY 2016-2017. During these unique patient hospitalizations, the residents ordered 579 935 laboratory tests and 29 881 radiology tests. The resident who ordered the most laboratory tests (n = 13 604) ordered more than 7 times the tests than the resident who ordered the least (n = 1870) (interquartile range [IQR] , 3509-6148) (Figure 1) . The resident who ordered the most tests per unique patient hospitalization ordered 41.2 tests per patient compared with 9.0 tests per patient for the resident who ordered the least (IQR, ), a 4.6-fold difference. The resident who ordered the most radiology tests (n = 826) ordered approximately 8 times the tests than the resident who ordered the least (n = 104) (IQR, and approximately 3 times the tests per unique patient hospitalization (range, 1.6-5.0; IQR, 1.9-2.4) (Figure 2) . Linear regression showed an association between postgraduate year (PGY) and the total number of laboratory tests ordered (R 2 = 0.21; slope, −1187) and between PGY and the number of laboratory tests per patient (R 2 = 0.19; slope, −3.2) but demonstrated no such associations for radiology testing (R 2 < 0.01 for both). There was also a strong association between the total number of tests ordered and the mean number of tests per patient for both laboratory orders (R 2 = 0.85; slope, 325) and radiology orders (R 2 = 0.61; slope, 132).
Discussion | This study found that over the course of AY 2016-2017 some residents ordered 7 to 8 times more diagnostic tests than their peers. Even excluding outliers, we observed much more variation in diagnostic test ordering volume than expected given that there were minimal differences in resident schedules among each PGY cohort during the 1-year period. The residents in their first PGY residents tended to order more laboratory tests than the residents in their second or third PGY, Editor's Note page 1721 
